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CHAPTER 14
Acting in a National Play: Governmental 
Roles During the Zwarte Piet Contestation
Pieter Wagenaar and Jeroen Rodenberg
IntroductIon
On entering Gouda, one noticed it as soon as one left the train. 
This was a town that had prepared for serious disturbances. In the hope 
of preventing hostilities between opposing groups, billboards had been 
put up just outside the railway station, directing different passengers to 
different locations. And the police also stopped and questioned visitors. 
As Gouda used to be a fortified town in the past, a moat still separates 
its historic center from more recent parts. The police used the bridges 
across it as checkpoints, trying to prevent unwanted visitors from enter-
ing. Downtown Gouda itself was swarming with riot police and with pri-
vate security firm employees. Yet it wasn’t a major soccer match the town 
was holding itself ready for. Gouda was awaiting the entry of Sinterklaas.
‘Sinterklaas’, ‘Saint Nicholas’ in English, is the Dutch version of 
Santa Claus, of which he is a predecessor. His feast is celebrated on the 
evening of December 5, but preparations start much earlier. Each year 
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he enters the country at around the 11 of November, which is a festiv-
ity in itself that can be witnessed in every Dutch municipality. One of 
these entries counts as the national arrival and is broadcast on television. 
Gouda hosted it on November 15, 2014. Yet, the reason Gouda had 
so diligently prepared for civil unrest has little to do with the figure of 
Sinterklaas itself, as that is relatively uncontested. It is Sinterklaas’ ret-
inue that is a source of societal conflict. As it happens the good Saint 
is accompanied by a host of Zwarte Pieten (‘Black Peters’), dressed in 
 sixteenth-century Spanish costumes, and wearing black makeup. Between 
November 11 and December 6, these Pieten are unavoidable. They are 
all over the media and can also be encountered in shops, in schools, in 
hospitals, etc. Some groups in society consider them a racist remnant of 
a colonial past and of slavery, and an insult to the Afro-Dutch. Other 
groups, however, see Zwarte Pieten as a touchstone of Dutchness, as a 
vital part of their identity, and are neither willing to part with them vol-
untarily, nor to change their color. As Albert van der Zeijden (2012), a 
scholar studying intangible heritage in the Netherlands, has remarked:
the question where the politicization of Black Pete comes from, is easy to 
answer. In a multi-ethnic society, where many ethnic groups live together in a 
more and more globalizing world, a situation emerged where various groups 
attach different meaning to traditions, to their own and that from others.
As the 2017 Charlottesville riots show, the Zwarte Piet controversy is 
not unique. Similar conflicts can be found in other societies as well, as 
is shown in this volume. They are known as ‘cultural contestation’ (Ross 
2007, 2009a, b).
culturAl contEstAtIon
Political scientists distinguish between different ways of looking at 
conflict. Brubaker, for instance, discerns four: inductive approaches, 
theory-driven rational action approaches, culturalist approaches, 
and ‘ritual—symbolism—performance’ (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). 
Docherty (2001: 29–35), a student of peacebuilding, prefers to speak 
of ‘worlds’: different aspects of conflict that are always there, and that 
all need to be addressed if conflicts are to be solved. The first of these 
worlds is ‘rational’. It relates to the distribution of power and resources. 
The second world, the ‘relational’ one, is about the way opposing groups 
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communicate with each other. In the last world, the ‘symbolic’ one, the 
one that concerns Docherty the most, emotions, values, and identities 
are at stake. ‘Cultural contestation’ is at its very heart.
Cultural contestation usually takes the form of conflicts over heritage. 
Yet, heritage conflicts can arise from other sources as well, and it is nec-
essary to make the distinction. Roughly speaking heritage can become 
the object of dispute for four reasons. It can be contested because there 
are several parties laying claims to it (the Elgin marbles); it can become a 
source of conflict when different functions are ascribed to it by interested 
parties (an agricultural field versus an archeological site); sad memories 
can be attached to it (former concentration camps); and then, there is 
cultural contestation. This last form of conflict over heritage arises when 
practices that are vital to the identity of one group are considered to 
be highly insulting and threatening to another (the Orange parades in 
Ulster). The political scientist Marc Howard Ross, who has pioneered 
the study of cultural contestation, observes that such conflicts can be 
fierce, as they are ‘about inclusion and exclusion from a society’s sym-
bolic landscape and that such inclusion or exclusion tells us about the 
politics of acceptance, rejection, and access to a society’s resources and 
opportunities’ (Ross 2009a: 1). In a similar vein, Sharon MacDonald has 
remarked that ‘identity theorists have long argued that collective identi-
ties are produced relationally through processes of opposition—defining 
Us in relation to Them’ (…). ‘This is then consolidated by identifying 
content which is taken as marking ‘Us-ness’- the construction of differ-
entiating symbols’ and what in German are called “Gegenbilder” (coun-
terimages)’ (MacDonald 2004: 54). An attack on these symbols can 
subsequently be perceived as a threat to one’s very identity. Obviously, 
though, these symbols themselves can be equally menacing to others.
thE rolE of GovErnmEnt
According to Ross, there is little government can do once cultural con-
testation arises. It usually simply hasn’t the legitimacy to act against it 
(Ross 2007: 90). Yet, as Ross own work, and that of those he inspired 
shows, it does try. Great Britain, for instance, has a ‘parades commis-
sion’, that needs to grant permission for contested marches (Ross 2007: 
6–7). The British government also subsidizes the painting of murals in 
Ulster, trying to substitute neutral works of art for controversial ones 
(Hartnett 2010: 70, 95–96). There thus appears to be a gap in our 
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knowledge of cultural contestation. We know that governments some-
times do try to solve it, but these interventions haven’t been systemati-
cally studied yet. A small body of literature on peacemaking efforts in the 
‘symbolic world’ of conflict does exist, though.
Michelle LeBaron, who has studied the symbolic layer of conflict 
resolution, stresses the importance of cultural fluency: the ability to 
see through each other’s lenses. Stories, myths, rituals, and metaphors 
have an important role in this (LeBaron 2003; LeBaron and Pillay 
2006: 275–28). Lisa Schirch (2005) has devoted an entire edited vol-
ume to the part ritual plays in conflict-solving, and Paul Lederach pays 
considerable attention to it as well (Lederach and Lederach 2010). 
Marc Howard Ross asks attention for the role of the contested ritu-
als and symbols themselves, especially for the degree to which these 
are inclusive or exclusive. He finds that it quite often is possible to 
make contested practices more inclusive; even to make these symbol-
ize inclusion. As ‘more inclusive symbols and rituals can draw former 
opponents into a new relationship while more exclusive ones harden 
the lines of differentiation’, this is vital (Ross 2007: 3, 16–17, 26–27, 
81–82; Ross 2009b: 2, 13, 18). Government, according to Ross, lacks 
the legitimacy to change (the meaning of) such practices. Yet, civic 
leaders sometimes can. The outcomes these might be able to real-
ize won’t satisfy everyone, but they might be a good enough solu-
tion for most of those involved (Ross 2007: 125, 284; Smithey 2009: 
102–103).
In this chapter, we look into the question of how the Dutch gov-
ernment, which found itself forced to handle the Zwarte Piet contro-
versy, dealt with cultural contestation. In order to gather data, we have 
interviewed all parties involved.1 We have attended (protest) meetings 
and manifestations, and one of the court cases concerning Zwarte Piet. 
We’ve also analyzed everything the media reported on the matter and 
studied what went on in various social media.
A hIstory of contEstAtIon
Where Zwarte Piet comes from nobody knows for sure. Theories 
abound, but it seems reasonable to assume that the figure—in its cur-
rent form—was invented in 1850, by Amsterdam school teacher Jan 
Schenkman (for a different opinion, see van Trigt 2016: 120–148). 
In that year, Schenkman published a children’s book that would 
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provide a kind of blueprint for the feast of Sinterklaas as it is today. 
Yet, it took decades before celebrating Sinterklaas Schenkman style had 
spread through all of the country. In many places, this happened only 
after the Second World War (Helsloot 2000). It would take equally 
long before protests against Zwarte Piet were voiced. The journalist 
Herman Salomonson was the first, in an article in the weekly De Groene 
Amsterdammer in 1930.2 More than three decades later primary school 
teacher Arnold Ras followed in his footsteps, actually abolishing the 
figure’s black makeup in the village of Wanroij. He encountered very 
competent opposition. Writer Godfried Bomans, who, as one of the 
country’s first TV celebrities enjoyed enormous popularity, personally 
intervened.3
Five years later, in 1968, a Mrs. Grünbauer from the town of Leiden 
continued where Ras had had to give up. It would take until the 
1980s, though, until the protest got really underway. The independ-
ence of Suriname in 1975 was followed by a wave of emigration to the 
Netherlands. A few years later, opposition against Zwarte Piet became 
structural. In the 1990s, these voices were finally heard, at least in 
Amsterdam. Pieten of many different colors made their entry there, dur-
ing the arrival of Sinterklaas in 1993, and in 1998, primary schools in 
one of the Amsterdam neighborhoods received a ‘Saint Nicholas code’. 
The controversy obtained an international dimension in 2003, when 
the Dutch chapter of the Global African Congress petitioned parliament 
(Helsloot 2005). Many of these initiatives met with opposition. An anti-
Piet exposition/manifestation in the town of Eindhoven in 2008 even 
elicited such alarming reactions, that it had to be discontinued (van der 
Pijl and Goulordava 2014).
The current controversy started at the end of 2010. A group of young 
activists had decided to once and for all put an end to Zwarte Piet and 
had been brainstorming on possible actions. It finally decided to have 
t-shirts printed, carrying the text ‘Zwarte Piet is racisme’ (‘Black Pete is 
racism’), and to wear these during the national arrival of Sinterklaas in 
Dordrecht in 2011, as an artistic protest.4 During this performance, the 
artists Quinsy Gario and Kno’Ledge Cesare (pseudonym of Jerry Afriyie) 
were arrested. The police next detained them for seven hours and fined 
them. Yet, the following day a similar protest was held in Amsterdam 
(Helsloot 2012a, b). The activists also wrote a letter to mayor Van der 
Laan of Amsterdam, and one of them, Raul Balai, addressed Van der 
Laan personally, when he ran into him at a reception.5
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Heritage Listing
In the meantime, a different development had been set in motion: 
including the feast of Sinterklaas in the national inventory of 
intangible heritage. In 2012, the Netherlands signed the 2003 
UNESCO-agreement on the safeguarding of intangible heritage. 
The institute responsible for the Dutch intangible heritage list is the 
Knowledge Center for Intangible Heritage in the Netherlands (KIEN); 
not a government body, but a quango-like organization subsidized by 
the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science. It had held a survey on 
the question of which traditions are considered to be most important in 
the Netherlands in 2010, from which it emerged that Sinterklaas exceeds 
every other Dutch tradition in popularity (Strouken 2010). Naturally, 
therefore, it was a prime candidate for heritage listing (van der Zeijden 
2014). On December 5, 2012, when the Netherlands signed the afore-
mentioned agreement, Sinterklaas, without Zwarte Piet, was presented 
to UNESCO, in Paris. Ineke Strouken—KIEN’s director—explained 
that Zwarte Piet was absent, because of the contested nature of the 
figure.6
It is not necessarily the KIEN itself, though, that nominates heritage 
for inclusion in the inventory. ‘Communities’ who count as the ‘owners’ 
of a specific heritage can do so, with the support of the KIEN (Margry 
2014). The KIEN has contacts with all important Sinterklaas organiza-
tions. It had been warning these about the troubles which might arise 
from Zwarte Piet for years, when it was preparing the inclusion of the 
feast on the national heritage list. When it asked an umbrella organiza-
tion called the Saint Nicolas Society to apply for the heritage listing of 
the feast, it therefore specifically requested it to write a paragraph on 
how it would deal with the Zwarte Piet question. Eventually, this would 
prove to be a reason for the society to not continue with the procedure.7
When the debate got truly underway, in 2013, Sinterklaas had there-
fore not yet been listed. The media attention hit the Sinterklaas organ-
izations ‘like a tsunami’, according to KIEN director Ineke Strouken. 
The many thousands of people who thought they were simply involved 
in the organization of a children’s’ festivity, now all of a sudden found 
themselves being accused of racism. They looked to the KIEN for help, 
but so did many people opposing Zwarte Piet, leading to another tsu-
nami: this time of e-mails sent to the KIEN. The numbers of these ran 
into the tens of thousands, and they often carried highly insulting and 
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menacing messages. People also contacted the highest civil servant at the 
ministry, to try to get Mrs. Strouken fired, and activists visited her at her 
office, to try and bully her into subscribing to their views. At a certain 
moment, when she was receiving an average of 1.500 hate mails a day, it 
became impossible for Mrs. Strouken to answer these or to even pick up 
the phone.8 Yet, that didn’t mean the KIEN withdrew from the discus-
sion, as, indeed, it couldn’t. In order to facilitate the societal debate, the 
KIEN commissioned several publications in 2014. One was an enquiry 
among the most important spokespersons of both sides to the con-
flict, to try and find solutions; one was a book on the origins of Zwarte 
Piet; one was an explanation of the debate for foreign news media; and 
one was a comic book to facilitate the debate among school children. 
The KIEN also published educational material on the history of Dutch 
slavery.9
During the controversy, a new umbrella organization for the many 
local Sinterklaas committees came into being: the ‘Sint & Pietengilde’ 
(Saint Nicholas and Peters Guild). It moved into the void the Saint 
Nicholas Society had left behind and became the community responsi-
ble for the heritage listing of the feast. At the start of 2015, it got the 
feast included in the national heritage list.10 The ministry, obviously very 
worried by the way the controversy had spread through the country, had 
requested the KIEN to have this postponed three times.11
The UN
When word got out that the KIEN was trying to get Zwarte Piet her-
itage listed, Barryl Biekman, a Dutch politician and chairwoman of 
the National Platform for the History of Slavery, contacted the UN 
(Wouters 2014). Her protest was supported by UN-advisor prof. Verene 
Shepherd. In January 2013, prof. Shepherd informed the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
pointing out that the Netherlands was trying to get a tradition included 
in the UNESCO intangible heritage list, that her informants consid-
ered to be racist.12 In October of that year, she visited the Netherlands, 
protesting Zwarte Piet, and in November 2013, the OHCHR itself got 
involved. That same month, the Working Group of Experts on People 
of African Descent, chaired by prof. Shepherd, called on the Dutch gov-
ernment to initiate a respectful societal debate on Zwarte Piet.13 Later, 
in 2014, prof. Shepherd, together with the working group she had 
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chaired until recently, would meet Dutch Minister Asscher, to discuss 
the matter. She remained of the opinion that Zwarte Piet, as a hate-
ful remnant of a colonial past, would need to change.14 A year later, 
the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) published its periodical report on 
the Netherlands. It had been informed by the Dutch Section of the 
International Commission of Jurists, which had presented a report drawn 
up by 27 NGOs. This shadow report started with Zwarte Piet and with 
the way the discussion on the figure had progressed in the Netherlands 
(Nederlands Juristen Comité voor de Mensenrechten 2015). Small won-
der then, that many of the questions the CERD addressed to represent-
atives of the Dutch government concerned the figure (Blokker 2015a). 
The government representatives, in their turn, pointed out that Minister 
Asscher was already organizing a dialogue between opponents and pro-
ponents of Zwarte Piet (Blokker 2015b). Nonetheless, the CERD 
remained concerned. In its Concluding Observations, in articles 15–18, it 
dealt with Zwarte Piet. Article 18 read:
Considering that even a deeply-rooted cultural tradition does not justify 
discriminatory practices and stereotypes, the Committee recommends 
that the State party actively promote the elimination of those features 
of the character of Black Pete which reflect negative stereotypes and are 
experienced by many people of African descent as a vestige of slavery. 
The Committee recommends that the State party find a reasonable bal-
ance, such as a different portrayal of Black Pete and ensure respect of 
human dignity and human rights of all inhabitants of the State party. The 
Committee further recommends that the State party ensure non-discrim-
ination in the enjoyment of freedom of expression and association, and 
that attacks on protesters be effectively investigated and duly prosecuted. 
(Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2015)
Prime Minister Rutte saw no need for government intervention in 
the appearance of Zwarte Piet, however. The same went for Minister 
Asscher, although as a private person he was of the opinion that the 
figure would need to change.15 Leaving it to society, though, would 
probably not be a solution to the CERD’s concerns. According to a 
survey, a very large majority of Dutchmen felt that the UN recommen-
dation needed to be ignored, and the Sint & Pietengilde—responsible 
for Piet’s national heritage listing—wrote an open letter to the UN.16 
Yet, the UN’s intervention already had had its effect, much earlier. 
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When prof. Shepherd had visited the country, this had produced such 
media attention, that Zwarte Piet had finally been put on the societal 
agenda. For Mandy Roos, a sixteen-year-old girl from The Hague, it 
had been a reason to organize a massive pro-Piet manifestation; another 
event the media jumped on. It was also the reason two Internet entre-
preneurs from the province of Brabant created a pro-Piet Facebook 
page, which received over two mln. likes in 48 hours. Mandy Roos later 
presented these to a politician from the right-wing populist party PVV, 
another media event.17 Now nobody could ignore the problem anymore.
Court Cases
In the meantime, a different process had been set in motion. Next to 
organizing protests, anti-Piet activists had also started legal proceedings. 
In 2013, Quinsy Gario had begun encouraging people to file objections 
to the entry of Sinterklaas at the municipality of Amsterdam (Kozijn 
2014). These were rejected by the Amsterdam commission of appeal 
on October 30, 2013. In reaction, on May 22, 2014, the activists took 
the case to the Amsterdam court of law, and successfully. On July 3, the 
court ruled that burgomaster Van der Laan should not have granted a 
permit for the arrival of Sinterklaas without taking the interests of those 
objecting to Zwarte Piet into consideration, as the private life of these is 
severely disturbed by the negative stereotypical traits of the figure. Again 
(international) media attention was massive.18
Van der Laan, in his turn, opposed the idea that the municipality 
was under the obligation to judge the contents of events for which it 
granted permits before these had even been held. He therefore appealed 
to the Council of State: the Netherlands’ highest court of appeal in 
administrative law cases. The council heard all parties on October 16 
and overturned the ruling of the Amsterdam court on November 12. 
Its main consideration was that judging the contents of events a priori 
would go against the constitution. Yet, it refrained from rulings on the 
exact character of Zwarte Piet and pointed to the possibility of initiat-
ing civil law cases (Blokker 2014c). Legists were quick to point out that 
chances would be limited. To all probability, the law would not provide 
the means to ban Zwarte Piet.19 The court cases were to have a differ-
ent effect, though. They were the main reason for the establishment of 
the Sint & Pietengilde, that was later to get Sinterklaas heritage listed 
(van der Zeijden 2014).
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And then there were individual law suits. A mother from the town of 
Utrecht filed a complaint against a primary school at the Dutch human 
rights council because of Zwarte Piet. She lost her case, on November 4, 
2014, but the council did stipulate that in the future the school would 
need to take care to change all those features of Zwarte Piet that could 
be considered stereotyping.20 Quinsy Gario and Jerry Afriyie protested 
their arrest in 2011 at the national Ombudsman, and won, but the police 
would, in its turn, file a complaint about Afriyie, when he resisted arrest 
during the arrival of Sinterklaas in Gouda in 2014. This led to the with-
drawal of Afriyie’s permit to work in private security, and to a lengthy 
lawsuit.21 Quinsy Gario, who had received an astonishing amount of 
death threats and insults in the course of the contestation, filed 771 
complaints against the senders of these.22 And on KetiKoti, the yearly 
commemoration of the abolition of slavery, attendants were called on to 
file complaints against Zwarte Piet. Hundreds of people did, but in the 
end this law suit would prove to be unsuccessful too.23 The media loved 
it, as they loved everything pertaining to the controversy, and, indeed, 
were instrumental in keeping it going.
thE mEdIA
After prof. Shepherd’s intervention in 2013, the media exploded. From 
that moment on, Zwarte Piet was on the news always (Slagter 2014; 
Linders 2016). Every paper reported on the discussion, and talk shows 
on television devoted considerable attention to the topic as well. The 
most talked about being a confrontation between Quinsy Gario and 
Utrecht politician/pop singer/media personality Henk Westbroek on 
the Pauw and Witteman show.24 And the international media soon fol-
lowed suit. Any major event during the Dutch Zwarte Piet discussion 
was faithfully reported all over the world. In 2015, CNN even broad-
cast a documentary on the topic, which wasn’t the first, as documentary 
filmmaker Sunny Bergman had already paved the way a year before.25 
According to several of the people who we have interviewed, the media 
proved to be uninterested in subtle statements, thus contributing consid-
erably to the ongoing polarization.26
The social media were quick to follow. Zwarte Piet proved to be an 
endless source of online debates, which have been dutifully analyzed 
by scholars studying communication (van Es et al. 2014; Hilhors and 
Hermes 2016). Often, these posts were of a highly offensive nature. 
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The ‘Contact Point for Discrimination on the Internet’ (Meldpunt 
Discriminatie Internet), which analyzes such posts, noticed a change 
in the racist slurs it reports on. In the past, anti-Semitism was the most 
important category, followed by anti-Muslim remarks, while Afrofobia 
took the third place. Now, all of a sudden, Afrofobia came second.27
A very important actor in the world of the media was the so-called 
Sinterklaasjournaal (Saint Nicholas news flash). The Sinterklaasjournaal 
is a daily television show, which starts five days prior to the arrival of 
the good saint, to end when he leaves the country again. It is produced 
by public broadcasting company NTR, and although it is not the only 
Sinterklaas TV-show, it is by far the most influential. Each year it is 
watched by hundreds of thousands of children.
As the Sinterklaasjournaal is so dutifully watched by small children, 
who still believe the saint actually exists, Sinterklaas committees all over 
the country keep a watchful eye on it. They try to copy the appearance 
of Sinterklaas and the Zwarte Pieten as close as possible, so as not to 
confuse the children when they stage the arrival of the saint locally. 
Naturally, therefore, what the Sinterklaasjournaal would do with the 
Pieten was of great importance, a thing all parties involved realized.
Yet, when the controversy gained national attention, in 2013, there 
was little the Sinterklaasjournaal could still change, as all the preparations 
for the show had already been made. The following year it organized dis-
cussions among its 35 people strong staff, though. Four of these were 
to decide what would happen with Zwarte Piet (Kuiper 2014). These 
filmmakers were shielded off from direct confrontation with the various 
groups of activists, could not read the many e-mails on Zwarte Piet the 
NTR received, and kept their plans a secret. Paul Römer, NTR’s direc-
tor, claims that not even he could influence the screenplay they were 
working on.28 When the actors each received a script—from which the 
final episode was missing—it was accompanied by a confidentiality agree-
ment (Takken 2014). The evening the show’s first episode was aired it 
turned out that it had attracted 25% more viewers than in previous years 
(Kuiper 2014). It had a very clever scenario, which was not only full of 
references to the ongoing Zwarte Piet discussion, but also had a story 
line explaining why Pieten in different shades of black made their entry 
in the show. Thus, it enabled every Sinterklaas committee in the coun-
try to choose the Pieten it felt best suited its particular points of view. 
And at the end of the show, the Sinterklaasjournaal even introduced a 
Saint Nicholas wearing black makeup.29 Naturally, not everybody was 
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happy with what the Sinterklaasjournaal had done. The chairman of the 
Saint Nicholas Society, e.g., realizing the impact the show would have, 
was appalled by the fact that a subsidized broadcasting company tried to 
influence a discussion society was still deeply entangled in.30
GovErnmEnt
People opposing Zwarte Piet had always been of the opposite opinion. 
They had complained about the lack of government intervention for 
many years (Knevel et al. 2011; Khaibar 2013; Bijnaar and Maris 2014; 
Kozijn 2014). Naturally, there had been several politicians who had pro-
tested the figure—Amsterdam council member Peggy Burke is a notable 
example—but these were the exception.31 When news company PowNed 
tried to interview Dutch politicians on the controversy many of them 
shied away or downplayed the discussion; a thing that did not fail to pro-
voke the irritation of Zwarte Piet’s opponents.32 And when television 
personality Paul de Leeuw sent a copy of Solomon Northup’s Twelve 
years a slave to every Dutch member of parliament, to protest Zwarte 
Piet, he received only three thank you letters (Kozijn 2014: 106; van der 
Pijl and Goulordova 2014: 269). At the same time, local government 
was often instrumental in maintaining the tradition, as half of the arrivals 
of Sinterklaas receive government subsidies (Helsloot 2012b: 139–141). 
Several mayors also voiced their support for the figure,33 and right-wing 
politician Geert Wilders even tried to pass a law protecting it.34 Prime 
Minister Rutte’s reaction to the CERD report was yet another disap-
pointment to anti-Piet activists.35 At local government level nevertheless, 
in Amsterdam, where opposition against the figure was strongest, things 
had already started to change.
In 2012, anti-Piet activists Quinsy Gario, Jerry Afriyie, and Raul Balai 
had sent Amsterdam mayor Van der Laan a letter. As a consequence 
they then had a meeting with him and with the committee that organ-
izes the Amsterdam arrival of Sinterklaas, taking activist Miguel Heilbron 
with them. The committee was represented by the Mennonite clergy-
man Henk Leegte, the actor Jeroen Krabbé, and businessman Raymond 
Borsboom. As a consequence, the committee decided to have the munic-
ipality hold an inquiry into the opposition to Zwarte Piet, but for awhile 
little else happened. Yet, when the activists took the municipality to 
court, something that received enormous attention of Dutch and foreign 
media, action was required. Leegte, then one of the two chairmen of the 
14 ACTING IN A NATIONAL PLAY: GOVERNMENTAL ROLES …  295
committee, felt contestation was getting to big for a voluntary organ-
ization to handle, and asked Van der Laan to intervene. He also asked 
management consultant Adriaan Krans to succeed him as a chairman of 
the committee. The mayor, who had already written a letter to the coun-
cil about the question, now decided to mediate (Broer 2014; Gemeente 
Amsterdam: Bureau Onderzoek en Statistiek: 2012).
On March 24, 2014, all parties involved met in the mayor’s official 
residence, a place Van der Laan uses for officious meetings. Paul Römer, 
director of broadcasting company NTR, was present as well, but as an 
onlooker only. This first meeting had a purely exploratory character. It 
was meant for establishing what the problems were that the different 
parties wanted to address and for finding common ground. The second 
meeting, on May 20, didn’t lead to closure either. Adriaan Krans, who 
was intrinsically motivated to change Zwarte Piet, but also realized that 
something needed to change for pragmatic reasons, then came with a 
solution he could sell to his constituents. An explanation people in favor 
of Zwarte Piet often give for his black makeup is that he is black from 
entering homes through the chimney at night, in order to leave behind 
presents for the children. Why not change his makeup in such a way that 
he really looked like he was black from sooth, by giving him a few black 
smudges in his face only? In that way the figure would still fit all the sto-
ries he is surrounded with, and thus be acceptable to his constituents, 
yet accusations of blackface would become untenable. Krans explained 
to his constituents—who would be none too enthusiastic—that some-
thing needed to be done. One of the arguments he used was that the 
Amsterdam arrival is dependent on sponsoring from private business. As 
the tradition was becoming ever more contested, this source of income 
was drying up. An end to the contestation was not foreseeable, yet if it 
wasn’t ended soon, survival of the tradition would be in danger. This 
was the reason, he argued, that change was in order. To allow people to 
get accustomed to the change slowly, the introduction would be grad-
ual: changing 25% of the Pieten into ‘sooth Pieten’ every year. Part of 
the deal Krans proposed was also that accusations of racism would be 
dropped. Van der Laan then had bilateral meetings with the different 
parties involved and organized a last plenary meeting on August 8. The 
opponents of Zwarte Piet had not been enthusiastic about the gradual-
ness of the change, but most accepted the compromise. The NTR, which 
had been an onlooker only, could also work with it. The mayor now 
proposed to make the deal that had been reached official, by signing a 
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voluntary agreement. The explanations for why he took this step differ. 
Some say Van der Laan needed to be able to prove to the Council of 
State that this time he had taken the objections of part of the Amsterdam 
inhabitants into consideration, in order to prevent being taken to court 
again over the permit. Others believe that the mayor, who had a back-
ground as a lawyer specializing in mediation, was simply used to ending 
such processes with voluntary agreements. However, it may be, signing a 
voluntary agreement proved to be a step too far (Broer 2014).36
Yet, a compromise had been reached, and a week later the mayor sent 
a letter to the city council, and briefed the press. He also delivered a 
motivational speech to the Amsterdam Pieten, part of whom still needed 
to be convinced that change was necessary (Broer 2014).37 It had been a 
bumpy ride, as the activists had used two strategies—negotiating as well 
as suing—at the same time. This had forced the mayor into a kind of 
split personality too: suing and mediating simultaneously. Yet, he had the 
legitimacy to do the latter, as all parties involved accepted his author-
ity. It had meant, though, as journalist Bas Blokker has pointed out, that 
while claiming in court that he had no authority to influence the con-
tents of the Amsterdam Sinterklaas arrival beforehand, Van der Laan was 
doing exactly that in a different setting (Blokker 2014b).38
Elsewhere, things had been calmer, which is why the city of Utrecht, 
for instance, got away much easier. It had started a dialogue in 2014, 
just like Amsterdam, and had changed 20% of its Pieten into ‘confetti 
Pieten’. Resistance in the committee organizing the entry in Utrecht had 
been manageable, as had been the opposition to Zwarte Piet, and the 
press had been kept at bay by waiting to the very last before commu-
nicating changes. The chairman of the Utrecht committee was a con-
sultant specialized in lobbying and knew how to manage such processes. 
He kept in close contact with the mayor, but, contrary to Amsterdam, in 
Utrecht local government mainly played a facilitating role.39
The town of Gouda, which would host the national entry, would 
not be so lucky. When it had offered to host the national arrival of 
Sinterklaas, it had known about the contestation. Yet, what it had not 
foreseen is how huge the ensuing societal debate would become. It dis-
cussed the problem with proponents and opponents of Zwarte Piet, 
and with broadcasting company NTR, but obviously could not solve 
it. The town decided to introduce a few ‘themed’ Pieten, in the colors 
of the cheese and the treacle waffles Gouda is so famous for, but this 
did little to end the dispute.40 As was to be expected activists of both 
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parties chose to organize manifestations during the national entry. The 
municipality of Gouda had no legal means of preventing this, but did 
decide to keep the two groups apart. One group received permission 
to protest near the Gouda theater, the other near the town hall. For 
security reasons, the historic city center, where the entry was to be, was 
off-limits. The anti-Pieten did not agree to this, as it meant they would 
be kept away from the television cameras, but were warned beforehand 
that the police would act if they would try to enter the city center. 
Yet, they did so nonetheless, crossing the moat individually during the 
national arrival. At one p.m., they then tried to start a silent protest, 
but as soon as they did they were attacked by pro-Piet protesters, who 
had slipped through security as well. Now the police intervened, mak-
ing more than ninety arrests.41 Yet again (inter)national media atten-
tion was massive.
Obviously, the Zwarte Pieten discussion had gotten way too big 
for local government to handle, which is why central government was 
already intervening. Minister Asscher had been present at Van der Laan’s 
last meeting in Amsterdam and had now started to organize his own.42 
In September 2014, Asscher invited all parties involved to a roundta-
ble session. The exercise would be repeated at the start of 2015, and in 
September of that same year. Asscher’s intervention was different from 
Van der Laan’s, though. The Minister saw no role for government in 
coming up with the solution to the problem, but merely wanted to cre-
ate a forum, where all parties could meet and exchange views. His sole 
intention was to keep the dialogue going, hoping that the parties would 
also meet outside of the meetings he initiated, and in this he appears to 
have succeeded.43
toWArd closurE?
A few days after Saint Nicholas’ entry, mayor Van der Laan thanked 
Sinterklaas and his Pieten for carrying on in spite of everything they 
had had to endure, and for the way they had conducted the discus-
sion.44 A few other municipalities had experimented with untraditional 
Pieten in 2014 too, but in most places Piet had stayed as black as he 
had been before (Blokker 2014a).45 Would 2015 be different? The town 
of Groningen was quick to announce that in 2015 its Pieten would 
remain pitch-black, but other large towns declared they were opting for 
sooth Pieten. Such Pieten would also appear in Meppel, which was to 
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host 2015’s national entry,46 and even in the Belgian city of Antwerp, 
which has a Sinterklaas tradition similar to the Dutch one.47 Slowly 
but surely, therefore, closure seemed to be drawing near. Journalist 
Bas Blokker (2014d) claims that this had been a result of a deliberate 
strategy. In a peculiarly Dutch way, government had organized deliber-
ation between all opposing parties, in order to reach consensus among 
the largest possible group. The aim was to then isolate representatives 
of the radical fringes, and, as happened in Gouda, simply arrest these 
if they caused trouble. Several of our interviewees confirm Blokker’s 
claim.48 Pam Evenhuis, spokesperson of the committee that organizes 
the Amsterdam arrival of Sinterklaas, has explained how the Amsterdam 
solution of sooth Pieten was then exported to other towns. He himself 
addressed local government elsewhere, whereas Adriaan Krans spoke to 
the organizing committees.49 Utrecht was one of the cities that followed 
Amsterdam’s lead. It too introduced sooth Pieten and also adopted 
the Amsterdam percentage, although its organizing committee would 
have liked to make bigger changes.50 In 2015, the Amsterdam com-
mittee also employed a new strategy: calling attention away from the 
official entry and its Pieten. It did so by organizing Sinterklaas-related 
activities for underprivileged children, thus also conveying the message 
that Sinterklaas is a feast for everybody, and winning the hearts of the 
Amsterdam inhabitants.51
The effects of these initiatives were felt outside of the realm of the 
official entries too, in primary schools, for instance. As most of these are 
visited by Sinterklaas and his Pieten in November–December they have 
found it hard to stay out of the contestation. In 2014, some 14% of 
them had already changed Piet’s appearance52; a change that accelerated 
in 2015. The primary schools in the city of The Hague were the first to 
announce that they would be using sooth Pieten only, and, although the 
reactions were furious, schools elsewhere followed their example.53 This 
went for schools in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht—the coun-
try’s other large cities—and even in Groningen.54 Eventually, about a 
third of the country’s schools would change Piet’s appearance. A school 
in Utrecht even chose to substitute ‘Minions’ for its Pieten. The driver 
behind this transition was an action group called ‘Nederland wordt 
beter’ (the Netherlands are becoming better), and the Amsterdam com-
mittee (Blokker 2015c).55
Finally, there was commerce. For many shopkeepers, Sinterklaas is 
one of the most important events of the year, as their sales volumes so 
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depend on it. The organization of Dutch retail traders was therefore 
represented at Minister Asscher’s meetings. It hoped for a speedy end 
to the contestation, but in the meantime retail chains in the country 
needed to act. The strategies they employed differed. The Albert Heijn 
and HEMA supermarkets still sold products decorated with traditional 
Pieten, as did the big toy shops, but supermarkets Jumbo and Lidl opted 
for white ones.56 Luxury department store de Bijenkorf was a special 
case. It is famous for its Sinterklaas decorations, consisting of mechan-
ical Pieten who climb ropes, but decided to paint this gold instead of 
black.57 Unsurprisingly, then, wholesale window-dressers sold Pieten in 
every color imaginable, to suit their clients’ tastes.58 Yet, the actual win-
dow-dressing proved to be a different matter. All the big retail compa-
nies sought ways to remove the Pieten from their showcases. Only small 
independent shops sometimes displayed them.59 Behind this transition, 
there was the activity of an action group as well; this time one called 
‘MAD Mothers’.60 Commercial broadcasting companies, who were tar-
geted by MAD Mothers too, differed in their approach. RTL still had 
black Pieten, but Nickelodeon changed their color to white. Meanwhile, 
TV presenter Dieuwertje Blok, anchorwoman of public television’s 
Sinterklaasjournaal, publicly stated that Zwarte Piet’s appearance would 
have to change.61
However, to the great disappointment of the anti-Piet activists, most 
of the Sinterklaasjournaal’s Pieten stayed as black as they had always 
been, in spite of the Amsterdam committee’s efforts.62 And at the major-
ity of the arrivals Sinterklaas was also accompanied by classic black Black 
Pete’s. This even went for the entries into the big cities of Rotterdam 
and The Hague.63 Unsurprisingly therefore, 2015 again saw protesting. 
At the national entry in the town of Meppel, there was fierce contestation 
between supporters and opponents of Piet, some of whom were dressed 
in Black Panther uniforms. Yet, this time the police managed to keep 
the two groups apart without having to make arrests (Kuiper 2015).64 
Amsterdam’s main arrival went without protesting, but a smaller entry, 
in one of its boroughs, led to a confrontation. The same went for the 
Amsterdam ‘Sinterklaas departure’, one of the events that had been 
planned to draw attention away of the saint’s arrival.65 A Sinterklaas fes-
tivity public television had organized in Utrecht met with protests too.66 
In their turn, supporters of Piet also protested. The Utrecht school that 
had chosen to have minions accompany Sinterklaas was confronted with 
angry parents, dressed as Zwarte Pieten.67
300  P. WAGEnAAr And J. rodEnBErG
The real change would have to wait until 2016. That year Minister 
Asscher held another meeting with the stakeholders, most of whom 
signed a declaration, in which they promised to refrain from polariza-
tion.68 Amsterdam changed all its Pieten to sooth Pieten, and a small 
number of towns followed in its footsteps.69 A similar thing went for 
the schools: It was especially schools in the west of the country that 
changed Piet’s appearance.70 A bigger change was that some central 
government actors finally took a stand. Asscher stated, on television, 
that he felt that in this case the majority needed to give way to a minor-
ity, and that Piet’s appearance needed to change. State secretary Van der 
Steur even wrote a letter to parliament, claiming that the entire coali-
tion was of the same opinion, but the prime minister was quick to force 
him to withdraw it.71
The NTR Saint Nicholas Newsflash, which, as we have seen, plays 
an extremely important role in the debate, was under fire long before it 
actually started to broadcast in 2016. In May, three of the Newsflash’s 
most important actors announced they would no longer partake in the 
show.72 The same month 120 Dutch celebrities asked the broadcast-
ing company to change Piet, and the Dutch Ombudsman for Children 
declared that the figure was a violation of children’s’ rights.73 In 
October, a competing Saint Nicholas show, that of commercial broad-
casting company RTL, announced that it would modify Piet’s appear-
ance. It had been inspired by the Amsterdam approach. Minister Asscher 
was quick to voice his approval, but leading MP Halbe Zijlstra protested 
the change.74 When NTR’s Newsflash finally aired it turned out that it 
made use of Pieten in every imaginable color and pattern.75 It was now 
clearly instituting changes itself.
2016’s national Saint Nicholas entry was to be held in the town of 
Maassluis. Opponents of Black Pete were quick to announce that they 
would be present, and that this time their demonstration would not be 
peaceful. The NVU, a party on the extreme right of the political specter, 
made known that it would pay a visit to Maassluis as well.76 Maassluis 
mayor Edo Haan then took an active stance. He went to the meeting 
Minister Asscher had organized, and also had private meetings with the 
different stakeholders. He personally changed 20% of the Pieten to sooth 
Petes, and he came up with an innovative idea. Declaring that Maassluis 
didn’t just host the national entry, but also the national discussion, he 
had an exposition organized on the Dutch Saint Nicholas celebration’s 
controversial character throughout the ages. Naturally, he assigned places 
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for demonstrations, but he made sure that opponents and proponents 
of Black Pete would be kept apart, and took every precaution to guar-
antee the safety of the many children who would be present.77 Maassluis 
was to be turned into a fortress during the entry. The area where the 
entry was to be held would be sealed off, and an emergency ordinance 
was to be proclaimed, making it easier to stop and search people. A day 
before the entry two people were placed in preventive detention, and 
the prime minister called for calmness.78 When we ourselves entered 
the town, on November 12, we were stopped, interrogated, and frisked 
already at the railway station. The police also scanned our ID-cards. The 
same was to happen twice again, as the area was really only accessible 
to children and accompanying adults. The entry itself proved to be une-
ventful, as the busses carrying the protesters had stopped in Rotterdam. 
There the police arrested 197 people, as the mayor of Rotterdam, who 
had been warned by the secret service beforehand, had forbidden all 
demonstrations.79
And now, where are we now? In 2017, a new status quo appears to 
have materialized, with the large cities in the west of the country opting 
for sooth Petes, as do their schools, while the rest of the Netherlands 
sticks to its traditional ways.80 In line with this, the Saint Nicholas 
Newsflash has done away with its multicolored Petes and is now catering 
to both parties again.81
The number of those in favor of change has risen markedly, though, 
and most people seem to be fed up with the discussion.82 It is now the 
fringes of the opposing parties who keep up the fight, which is getting 
nastier. This year activists dressed up as traditional Petes visited the home 
of a politician who protests Pete and made a surprise visit to a meeting 
of the Amsterdam City council, and to a primary school. Pete’s oppo-
nents, in their turn, made a ‘Saint Nicholas house’ inaccessible by 
pouring liquid metal in its lock. A Saint Nicholas circus even had to be 
closed because of threats.83 Three buses with protesters tried to visit the 
national entry in the northern town of Dokkum, for which they had a 
permit. They were stopped in their way by activists in favor of Pete, who 
blocked the highway. The mayor of Dokkum, who had received warn-
ings that even greater disturbances were at hand, consequently forbade 
the demonstration.84 The highway blockaders, who will probably be 
prosecuted, were not without sympathizers. A lawyer offered them his 
services for free, and to pay a possible fine a fundraiser on the Internet 
collected more than 43.000 euros in a few days.85
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conclusIon
The cultural contestation surrounding the figure of ‘Zwarte Piet’, which 
has rocked the Netherlands from 2013 onwards, started with an attempt 
at heritage listing. It was protests at the UN against placement of the 
Sinterklaas celebration—of which Zwarte Piet is a part—on the national 
intangible heritage list, that put the contestation on the societal agenda. 
In the multicultural city of Amsterdam, civil society was the first to be 
confronted with the controversy. According to Ross that is where it 
could have been solved—as in his theory civic leaders can play a role in 
mitigating cultural contestation—but in this case it wasn’t. As the con-
troversy was simply too large for civil society to deal with, government 
was asked to intervene.
When analyzing the cultural contestation surrounding the symbol of 
Zwarte Piet, the large number of governmental actors involved in the 
discussion immediately springs to the eye. They range from the local 
level, such as the mayor of Amsterdam, to the national level in the per-
son of the Minister of social affairs Lodewijk Asscher, and even to the 
supranational level in the person of professor Verene Sheperd. They not 
only include the KIEN but also the national ombudsman. Even the judi-
ciary has been forced to take a stance in the debate.
When we take a closer look at these many different governmental 
actors, it becomes clear that all of them have acted on their own accord, 
based on their respective interests and competencies. They have reacted 
to other governmental actors or to requests from civil society. The dif-
ferent backgrounds, interests, and competencies of governmental actors 
partly define the different opinions they voice. Prime Minister Rutte, for 
example, took an altogether different stance on Zwarte Piet’s attire and 
makeup, than the Minister of social affairs, or the Amsterdam court of 
law, and, more recently, the National Ombudsman or the KIEN. This 
makes an analysis of governmental actions in this case of cultural contes-
tation difficult. Yet, we can still discern three roles they play.
In the first place, government actors act as facilitators of the tradition. 
After all, it is local authorities, most notably the mayors, who are respon-
sible for granting the permits for locally held entries of the Saint and his 
retinue. Many municipalities also subsidize local associations responsible 
for the entry.
Secondly, contrary to what Ross writes about the possibilities to 
mitigate, governmental actors have acted as passive mediators in the 
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discussion. Minister Lodewijk Asscher, for instance, has tried to bring 
parties together and to create a safe space where societal actors could dis-
cuss matters.
In the third place, government actors can try to actively mitigate 
the contestation, by not only bringing parties together, but also direct-
ing the discussion toward a workable outcome. This was done by 
Amsterdam mayor Van der Laan, who apparently had clear ideas on 
the desired conclusion to the discussion, and on the way to end the 
contestation.
Real mitigation, however, seems hard to attain. Several reasons lie at 
the root of this. In the first place, the cultural contestation surround-
ing Zwarte Piet is a discussion which is held at the national level, but 
played out on the local level. That, after all, is the level at which either 
protests are organized, or everything stays quiet. It is thus the local con-
text that determines the need for mitigation and the room for maneuver. 
In a left-wing liberal city like Utrecht, little mitigation was needed, as 
the local population was generally in favor of altering the appearance of 
Zwarte Piet. In ethnic and culturally diverse cities such as Amsterdam, 
the need for mitigation was higher, but, at the same time, it was this that 
created room for mitigation. In small provincial towns such as Dokkum, 
Maassluis, or Gouda, which have all hosted the national entry recently, 
the mayors had little room for mitigation and thus needed to restrict the 
protests. Secondly, the nature of the administrative system, in which dif-
ferent actors based on different competencies and interests act in differ-
ent ways, hinders mitigation efforts.
On the other hand, it is exactly the fact that contestation is played out 
at the local level, and the fact that government is fragmented, that might 
make attempts at mitigation possible. It is at this level, after all, that 
chances for successful mitigation are highest. The way mayor Van der 
Laan played his mitigating role during the national play is exemplary. His 
aim was to find a solution that would satisfy the largest possible group, 
and in this he eventually succeeded.
Yet, when we zoom out, and take a look at the nation as a whole, we 
can’t but notice that at present contestation is far from over. A recent 
survey shows that in most municipalities Piet remains as black as he 
always has been, which also goes for most of the schools. It is especially 
the larger—multicultural—cities in the west of the country where Black 
Pete’s appearance is changing. The rest of the country is still firmly stick-
ing to its guns.
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(member of the organizing committee of the Saint’s entry in Utrecht) 
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